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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
---------~-----~-------~----------------------------------------

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 17078

BERT LEON HANSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

..

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah
against the defendant/appellant Bert Leon Hanson, alleging that
defendant/appellant did recklessly cause the death of another,
Camie Lee Hanson, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

(1953), as amended,

§76-5-205, a felony of the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvIBR COURT

Defendant/appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of
manslaughter and was sentenced by the court to be confined in
the Utah State Prison for an undetermined term of not less than
one year nor more than fifteen years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant/appellant seeks that he be placed
on probation or that he be permitted to withdraw his
plea of guilty and that his case be remanded for trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The present case evolves from the death of
the infant daughter of defendant/appellant on September 4,
1979 in Roosevelt, Duchesne County, Utah.

Defendant was

charged with murder in the second degree, a felony of
the first degree.

In a preliminary hearing held October 18,

1979, in the Circuit Court, Seventh District, Duchesne
County, the Honorable Kenneth G. Anderton found sufficient
cause to bind the

matter over to the Fourth Judicial

District Court for further proceedings on November 13, 1979.
On November 5, 1979, defendant was admitted to
the psychiatric unit of St. Marks Hospital in Salt Lake
City for treatment of severe depression.

Arraignment was

continued to December 10, 1979, because defendant was
still hospitalized on November 13, 1979.
Defendant notified the District Court, pursuant to

s

s77-24-17, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) on November 26, of his intent-

ion to rely on an insanity defense.

Having been released from

St. Marks, defendant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of

-2-
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insanity at the December 10 arrai·gnment hearing.

Judge

David Sam ordered psychiatric examinations by two alienists
and set a jury trial for February 7, 1980.
Prior to the rescheduled trial date of March 5,
1980, defendant, through counsel, and in reliance upon the

reports of the court appointed alienists and his own medical
evidence, entered into plea bargainin9 with the prosecution.
Consequently an amended information charging defendant with
manslaughter, a felony of the second decree, was filed with
the court.

Foregoing his criminal culpability defense,

defendant pleaded guilty to the reduced charges in belief
credence would be given the medical reports.

The expert

opinions of examining alienists, along with the agreed
abstinence of the prosecuting attorney on sentence, that
defendant continue to receive treatment and not be incarcerated
were noted at this time in open court.

The court did state

that it was not bound by the recommendations of doctors,
the county attorney, or the Adult Probation and Parole
Department.

Sentencing was continued until April 11, 1980

to allow the Parole Department time to assess defendant's
background and prepare a pre-sentence report.
The investigation by the Department resulted in a
guideline recommendation of probation.

However, after a

hearing known as "paneling", the Department overruled the
recommendation and recommended incarceration without comment
or reasoning.
Having been advised by the court before sentencing that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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incarceration of defendant was inuninent, counsel moved in court
for a continuance of one week within which to file an affidavit
against Judge Sam proceeding in the case.
denied.

Such motion was

Counsel then made a motion to allow the withdrawal of

the guilty plea to allow trial on the original charge.
motion was also denied.

Such

After a stay of execution to allow time

to file a certificate of probable cause, defendant was committed
to the Utah State Pris·on for an indeterminate term of from one
to fifteen years, where he is now detained.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ABUSING
ITS DISCRETION BY NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO WITH-

DRAW. HIS GUILTY PLEA.
This appeal poses the problem of whether the trial judge
\

abused his discretion in not permitting defendant, prior to irnpos.i tion of sentence, to withdraw his guilty plea which was made
pursuant to a plea bargain.

Although it is well established in

Utah that §77-24-3, Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

(the statute controlling

withdrawal of guilty pleas at the time of the trial) does not
grant an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, but merely gives
the court discretionary power, it is just as well established that
the appellate court will interfere when the lower court has abused
its discretion.

At the outset it should be made clear that

appellant does not request that this policy be changed, so that
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in the future courts, would grant automatic approval to all
those wishing to retract their pleas.

Appellant merely urges

that this is just such an instance where the manifest injustice
perpetrated compels this Court to declare the right of petitioner
to withdraw his plea.
A.

THE PLEA BARGAINING SYSTEM

Defendant's plea of guilty to the reduced charge was a
result of plea bargaining with the prosecution.

Before consider-

ing the abuse in this particular instance, an understanding of
the role of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system is
necessary, as well as the rights of a defendant who has pleaded
guilty under a plea bargain and not received the concessions
anticipated under the bargain.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
efficacy of plea bargaining.

"[P] lea bargaining is an essential

component of the administration of justice.
it is to be encouraged."
(1971) .

Properly administered,

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257

It is impossible to see how the system is encouraged

by denying both the defendant's anticipated penalty or the right

to withdraw his plea.

In discussing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure, the Columbia Law Review takes note that
the "basic recognition that a defendant should be able to rely
on the authority of bargaining prosecutors seems sensible in
context of todays criminal justice sys·tern."
1072 (1976); accord:

76 Colum. L. Rev.

Jord'an v. Commonwealth, 225 S.E.2d 661,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

664 (Va. 1976}.

"Rule 11 now permits a defendant to withdraw

his guilty plea whenever a judge decides not to impose the
sentence upon which. the prosecutor and the defendant have
agreee."

Id, 1070.
This recognitition in the federal system of the right

to withdraw a plea, as well as in several state jurisdictions,
reflects the need of maintaining the integrity of the system in
the accused's perception of plea bargaining.

The policy reason

of keeping dockets clear applies to the state court system
as well as the federal.
present system.

Expediency is a major basis for the

Estimates of the percentage of cases settled

through guilty or nolo contendere pleas range as high as 95%.
9 Cum.L. Rev. i

(1978).

The willingnes·s of defendants to plead guilty is not
premised on a desire to unclog courts, but to bargain directly
for the sentence imposed, and thus avoid the uncertainties

o~

a trial result.
The defendant who enters a plea bargain with
the state offers his consent to judgment in exchange
for a substantially lighter sentence than he would
have received had he been convicted after trial.
This
sentence discount for defendants willing to plead
guilty is common knowledge among lawyers.
It has
been a fact of the American system of criminal
justice for at least half a century, and has recently
received the imprimatur of the United States Supreme
Court.
7 Linc. L. Rev. 138 (1972), citing Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-753 (1970); Parker v. N.C.,
397 U.S. 790, 795 (1970).
The arguments for upholding the plea bargaining system,
based both on its utility to the courts and the equitable
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fairness of allowing defendants to rely on bargains made
result in recognition for the process by legal organization.
Thus the American Bar Association has declared:
If the plea agreement contemplates the granting
of charge or sentence concessions by the trial judge,
he should
. permit withdrawal of the plea (or,
if it has not yet been accepted, withdrawal of the
tender of the plea) in any case in which the judge
determines not to grant charge or sentence concessions.
ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial
Judge, (Approved Draft) , § 4. 1.
The official conunentary to this section recommends
mandating that the defendant be given the opportunity to
withdraw his plea regardless· of the advance statements of the
judge concerning his concurrence, reasoning that there is
always· "at least the taint of false inducement."
The American Bar Association stance is echoed by
the American Law Institute:
If, at the time of sentencing, the court for
any reason determines to impose a sentence more
severe than that provided for in the plea agreement
between the parties, the ·court shall inf onn the
defendant of the fact and shall inform the defendant
that the court will entertain a motion to withdraw
the plea.
American Law Institutes's Model Code of Pre-arraignment
Procedure, § 350.6.
B.

JUDICIAL ABUSE IN THE PRESENT CASE

At the time of trial the withdrawal of a guilty plea in
Utah was controlled by

§

77-24-3, Utah Code Annotated, (1953).

This section permitted, prior to judgment, the plea to be withdrawn.

Numerous cases by the Utah Supreme Court construed that
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statute not to vest any absolute right in the accused, but
rather to give the trial judge a discretionary power.
theless-,

None-

the court has stated that it would interfere to set

aside a sentence whenever defendant can prove an abuse in
the failure to exercise that discretionary power.

State v.

Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337,339 (Utah 1977); State v. Soper, 559
P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1977).

The present case is a clear example

of such abuse.
(_Section 77-24-3 has been replaced in the new Code
of Criminal Procedure

1

effective July 1, 1980, by Section 77-13-6.

The new section also permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea
prior to conviction with good cause and leave of court.)
An increasing number of jurisdictions, as exemplified by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
are liberalizing the right of defendants to withdraw guilty
pleas whether before or after sentencing.

This recognition

may come through legislative or judicial action.

See e.q.

State v. Theurer, 118 N.J. Super.485, 288 A.2d 587 (1972),
rev'd 62 N.J.

64, 298 A.2d (1972); People v. Delles, 873 Cal.

Rept. 389, 447 P.2d 629, 632 (1968), providing:

If a defendant pleads guilty as part of a bargain
with an apparently authoritative and relaible public
official -- usually the prosecutor or, as here, the
trial judge himself -- whereby he is assured of receiving in return for his plea probation, a lenient
sentence, or some other form of special consideration,
the trial judge may not impose judgment contrary to
the terms of such bargain without affording the
defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea
either by a motion under Penal Code, section 1018
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before judgment (People v. Griggs, 17 Cal.2d,
621, 110 P.2d 1031) or by a motion to vacate
judgment or a petition in the nature of coram
nobia after judgment (People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal.2d
110, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173, 403 P.2d 429). (Emphasis
added.)
This trend, granting greater protection to the
accused's constitutional rights, is merely an extension of
the practice, acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court, that
plea withdrawal is occasionally necessary to prevent a
manifest injustice, therefore it is judicial abuse to deny
the motion to withdraw.

See State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124,

378 P.2d 671, 673 (1963); ABA Standards, supra.

The denial

of the withdrawal by the trial judge violated clearly
defined Utah standards.

It should have been withdrawn

pursuant to Utah and United States Supreme Court standards.
Santobello, supra,

~·

261; State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450,

453 (Utah 1978); State v. Olafson, 567 P.2d 156, 158
(Utah 1977), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969);
State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976).

Despite

the court having inquired as to the defendant's state of
mind and knowledge of the freedom of the court to act, the
circumstances under which the plea was entered indicate
that is was in reliance on medical evidence not supporting
incarceration as it would accomplish no purpose in treatment
or rehabilitation of the appellant in the prison facilities
as they presently exist.

The present plea should be declared

to be involuntary because it was made in belief that credence
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would be given the unanimous medical reports and a possible
meritorious culpability defense was dropped in reliance
thereon.

Defendant has been victimized if this Court

declares that after he entered freely into a system where
both sides negotiate, enter agreements, and more promises,
his plea and decision to drop a defense were voluntary even
when his anticipations are frustrated.

Although the court

may flatly state that the only promise was a recommend of
leniency, the logic and result defy the definition of
"voluntary".
In this regard it should be noted that generally,
motions to withdraw guilty pleas

are more liberally granted

when a potentially meritorious defense has been abandoned in
favor of a disregarded bargain.

See 66 A.L.R. 3d 896, 943

(1975); 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law ~ 505.

Considerting the

overwhelming, unanimous agreement of three psychiatrists
and one Ph.D. in psychology that defendant did not mean to
injure or cause death as indicated by his attempt to give
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation (see psychiatric evaluation of
Dr. Crist): that the death of the daughter was accidental
and that defendant has positive characteristics that can
be used with help of supportive psychotherapy (see Summary
and Recommendation, Psychological Assessment of Douglas K.
Gottfredson, Ph.D.); and that he "lacked substantial capacity"
and that ''it is my ultimate conclusion that his needs and
the needs of society would best be served if he were shifted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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from the criminal justice system to the mental health system
with compassion for his background"

(Report of Eugene J. Faux, M.D.

F.A.P.A.), it seems irrefutable that defendant gave up an arguably
valid insanity defense.
Yet respondents would argue that the subjective opinion
of one judge, contrary to all principles, skills and knowledge
used in sociology, psychology, psychiatry, criminology, and
generic social work, is not an abuse.

By denying the

attempt

to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial judge has not only defeated
the policy reasons behind plea bargaining, he has abused the
constitutional rights of this particular defendant.

Defendant

entered into good faith bargaining with the prosecution after
which he voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty.

He is not

presently asking this Court for clemency for his action, but
merely a return to status quo ante.

Defendant seeks the right

to proceed to his constitutionally guaranteed right to trial.
Further, the psychiatric findings of marginal I.Q.,
profound grief, mental defect, compel compassion and preclude a
holding that the plea was totally "voluntary and intelligent".

If

the possibility exists that defendant's actions did not meet the
standards of criminal responsibility, the possibility also exists
that defendant could not make a rational plea believing that all
medical evidence would be disregarded.

The trial judge abused

his power by failing to allow the withdrawal of the plea based
on his own personal feelings of the guilt
nature of the crime and facts.

199 I

393 p • 2d, 666

of the accused by the

See State v. Triplett, 96 Ariz.

(1964) •
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Th_e survival of th.e cons.ti tutional right to trial
Iias been noted in the United States Supreme Court and acknowledged by the. Supreme Court of Utah.
The right to a jury trial is constitutionally
guaranteed but it may be waived, and when no
issue is raised as to innocence, there is nothing
to try. Once a plea of guilty is knowingly and
voluntarily entered, there are no issues for trial.
State v. Yeck, 556 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977).
This fact of constitutional protection of the right
to trial, as well as it's application in the plea withdrawal
context, was noted by Justice Marshall in a partly concurring
opinion in Santobello, joined by Justice Brennan and Steward:
There is no need to belabor the fact that the
Constitution guarantees to all criminal defendants
the right to a trial by judge or jury, or, put
another way, the "right not to plead guilty," United
States v. Jackson, 390 US 570, 581, 20 L Ed 2d 138,
145, 88 S Ct 1209 (1968). This and other federal
rights may be waived through a guilty plea, but
such waivers are not lightly presumed and, in fact,
are viewed with the "utmost solicitude".
Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 US 238, 243, 23 L Ed 2d 274, 279, 89
S Ct 1790 (1969}.
Given this, I believe that where
the defendant presents a reason for vacating his
plea and the government has not relied on the plea
to its disadvantage, the plea may be vacated and the
right to trial regained, at least where the motion
to vacate is made prior to sentence and judgment.
In other words, in such circumstances I would not
deem the earlier plea to have irrevocably waived the
defendant's federal constitutional right to a trial.
Here, petitioner never claimed any automatic
right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing.
Rather, he tendered a specific reason why, in his
case, the plea should be vacated. (Emphasis added.)
Santobello, Supra, at 267.
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No Utah case seems on point in deciding the present
issue.

Although several cases hold that the ability to withdraw

a plea is discretionary, with the trial court, all are distinguishable.
Many Utah cases involve the attempt to withdraw the
guilty plea after sentencing, rather than before as present.
See, e.g. State v. Harris, supra; State v. Garfield, supra;
State v. Plum, supra.

Thus after apparently gambling with

the courts and being dissatisfied with the results, defendants
were denied a second chance.

Here, defendant constantly defened

his right to his bargained plea and had not lost it through
apathy or want of diligence, consider Ballard v. State,

131 Ga. App. 347, 207 SE 2d 246 (1974), in which, although
pursuant to a mandatory statute, the Georgia Supreme Court
showed compassion in allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea
by liberally construing the time of sentencing.

A. L. R.

Also note the

and Am. Jr. cites, ·supra, reconunending generous exercise

of discretion by the court in instances when the motion is made
timely, i.e., prior to sentencing.
Other Utah cases relied on for more compelling reasons
to deny the motion to withdraw.

Thus in Olafson and Yeck, supra,

express findings of voluntary and intelligent pleas were made.
In the Forsyth case, supra, the court was unwilling to believe
unsupported facts, in State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah 1977),
unwilling to believe self-serving statements.

-13-
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rationales apply at present.
Finally, in addition to these decisions that compel
a finding of abuse, the public policy arguments add a convincing voice.
It is in the public interest to maintain defendant,
confidence in the plea bargaining process.

In fact, the public

receives a double benefit in the instant case.

It is presented

with smoothly functioning unclogged courts in which defendants
comfortably bargain for fair and humane treatment, and it allows
the rehabilitation of a useful member of society.

Indeed, the

pre-sentence report prepared by the Adult Probation and Parole
Board indicates nothing but potential for defendant.
public loses

noth~ng

The

when this Court declares that as a matter

of fundamental fairness.

Defendant is entitled to a trial on

the merits.
POINT II

•

THE "PANELING" BY THE ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
DEPARTMENT WAS A VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS.
The trial judge had referred the matter of sentence
recommendation to the Adult Probation and Parole Department for
a pre-sentencing report.

The result of the department's investigatioi

as scored on an objective "guideline recornmendaton form" indicated
that defendant should be released on probation.

This recommendation,

along with the findings in the investigation that the individual
had mental and emotional problems, a stable employment history,

-14-
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a history as a victim of child abuse as corroborated by a member
of the Utah Highway Patrol, and the favorable comments of the
local Justice of the Peace in Roosevlet were overlooked after

the matter was "paneled" by the department.

This procedure

is of a meeting of department members in which they discuss
various referrals from the court and then make recommendations.

In the present case, "paneling" violated defendant's due process
rights, when over the guidelines they recom..mended incarceration ·

in the Utah State Prison.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
guarantees citizens the right to be present and heard and to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against them at any hearing

in which there is a possibility of a serious deprivation of
liberty.

See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

"Due

process of law is an opportunity to be heard and defend a substanti ve right.

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trus·t

&

s·avings Co.

v. Hill,

281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930).
.
.
,
d hlas ,oroa d app l'ica_ion:
+-'
This
right
to b e near

"The due process of law clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment does not take up the statutes of the several
States and make them the test of what it requires;
nor does it enable this Court to revise the decisions
of the state courts on questions of state law.
What i t does require is that state action, whether
through one agency or another, shall be consistent
with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions and not infrequently are designated as
'law of the la!').d'. Those principles are applicable
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alike in all the States and do not depend upon
or vary with local legislation." Hebert v. Louisiana,
272 us 312, 316, 317.
"This court has never attempted to define with
precision the words 'due process of law,' nor is it
necessary to do so in this case.
It is sufficient
to say that there are certain immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard, as
that no man shall be condemned in his person or
property without due notice and an opportunity of being
heard in his defence." Holden v. Hardy, 169 US 366,390.
Bute v. Illinois,333 US 647, 648 (1947).
The Supreme Court has also declared that the accused
has the right to be present at every stage of the trial at which
his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).

Although the

paneling was not a function of the trial court proper, it's
relationship to the whole was such that a denial of representation
at the hearing frustrated the trial fairness.
Defendant was entitled to legal counsel at every step
of the proceedings that may have lead to incarceration.

The

violation of this due process guarantee should result in this
Court ordering a reversal.
POIN·T III
INCARCERATION AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON CONSTITUTES
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
The United States Supreme Court has held the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution applicable to the states by reason
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.
660

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.

(1962).
The standards for what constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment have been explicitly laid out by the Federal District
Court in Utah, relying on United States Supreme Court directives,
in Clements v. Turner,

364 F. Supp. 270, 278 (D.C. Utah 1973):

The principal legal test for determining whether
punishment is cruel and unusual has come to be one
related to current community standards of decency.
This test asks whether under all the circumstances
the punishment in question is" . . . of such character
or consequences as to shock general conscience or to
be intolerable in fundamental fairness."
Lee v.
Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 ( th Cir. 1965) (see also
Church v. Hegstron, 416 F.2d 449, 451 [2d Cir. 1969]).
Underlying the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment is the basic concept
of "the dignity of man."
Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1958).
The Court added in Trap at 101,
78 S. Ct. at 598:
The Amendment must draw it's meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing socity.
To the above test have been'added two further
tests set forth by the court in Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674, at 679 (N .D.Cal. 1966).
punishment may be cruel and unusual if greatly
disproportionate to the offense for which i t is
imposed. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
368 (1910); Robinson v. State of California,
(370 U.S. 660) at 676, (1962) (concurring opinion
of Douglas J. ) ; Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889,
890 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Goldberg, J.).
Finally, a punishment may be cruel and unusual when,
although applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal
aim, it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve
that aim; that is, when a punishment is unnecessarily
cruel in view of the purpose for which i t is used.
Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 370,
30 S.Ct. 544; Robinson v. California, supra, 370 U.S.
at 677, (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.);
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Rudolph v~ Alabama, supra (375 U.S.) at 891,
84 S. Ct. at 155 (dissenting opinion of Goldberg,
J. ) .

Considering the totality of all factors, the
accused's history as a child abuse victim, his stability
and value to the general community despite his mental defects
and psychological problems, and the overwhelming possibility
of successful rehabilitative therapy as expressed by all
examining physicians, including appointed alienists, appointed
by the court, the decision to imprison defendant cannot be
said to meet the above standards, although sanctions against
defendant may ultimately be desirable to ensure that he
continues to conform to society's norms.

Incarceration not

only "goes beyond that legitimate penal aim," it is counterproductive to it.

It is cruel and unusual punishment to lock

defendant away from the

~upport

systems capable of rehabilitating

him in the circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
Appellant requests this Court to determine
incarceration under the reasoning of the trial court is
cruel and inhuman punishment, it being more logical to
impose a sanction of obtaining required treatment or be
incarcerated for failure to obtain treatment as the medical
evidence does not support incarceration for the act for
which there is evidence that the defendant committed, his
mental responsibility and knowledge and intent being questionable.
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In the alternative, appellant seeks a finding by this Court
that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to
permit the withdrawal of his voluntary plea of guilty prior
to sentencing and to permit him to be tried on the original
charge of second degree murder.
Respectfully submitted this

2

-----~

day of August,

19 80.

Robert{ M. McRae
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Defendant/appellant
319 West First South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84078
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